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Many pollution-related industries wield strong political inﬂuence and can eﬀectively
veto policy initiatives that would harm their proﬁts. A politically realistic approach
to environmental policy therefore seems to require the alleviation of signiﬁcant proﬁt-
losses to these industries. The regulatory authority can do this by freely allocating some
emissions permits or by exempting some inframarginal emissions from a pollution tax.
However, such policies compel the government to forego an eﬃcient potential revenue
source and to rely more heavily on ordinary distortionary taxes. As a result, achieving
distributional objectives comes at a cost in terms of eﬃciency.
Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we analyze the eﬃ-
ciency costs implied by the distributional constraint that adverse impacts on proﬁts in
particular industries must be avoided. Both models indicate that the eﬃciency cost
implied by this constraint dwarfs the other eﬃciency costs when the required amount
of abatement is very small. When the abatement requirement becomes more extensive,
however, the cost of this constraint diminishes relative to the other eﬃciency costs of
pollution-control.
We also calculate the compensation ratio: the share of potential policy revenue that
the government must forego to protect the industries in question. We show how this
ratio is aﬀected by the extent of abatement, supply and demand elasticities, and the
potential for end-of-pipe treatment. One deﬁnition of this ratio corresponds to the share
of pollution permits that must be freely allocated to prevent proﬁt-losses in the targeted
industries. Numerical simulations of sulfur dioxide pollution-control suggest that the
Bush Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative would exceed this ratio, freely allocating
more permits than necessary to preserve proﬁts. Our models also highlight signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between gross and net policy revenues: when abatement is extensive, a
large fraction of the revenue collected from emissions permits or taxes is oﬀset by the
revenue-loss from erosion of the base of existing factor taxes.1
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In evaluating environmental policies, economists tend to emphasize eﬃciency and cost-
eﬀectiveness. Yet the distributional impacts of policies clearly are highly relevant to
social welfare, and such impacts often critically inﬂuence political feasibility. Distribu-
tional eﬀects can be measured along a number of dimensions — across household income
groups, geographic regions, generations, and industries. An especially important di-
mension is the potential distribution of impacts across domestic industries. This reﬂects
the fact that industry groups constitute a powerful political force.1
The degree to which environmental policies impose burdens on given industries is
closely related to the capacity of these policies to generate public revenues or private
rents. Some policies generate considerable public revenue — these policies include emis-
sions taxes, fuel taxes, and systems of tradable permits in which the government initially
allocates the permits through an auction. These revenue-generating policies tend to
impose a large share of the economy-wide burden of regulation on the polluting ﬁrms.
Under these policies, ﬁrms not only incur abatement costs but also must pay for infra-
marginal pollution: they must either pay pollution taxes on such emissions or purchase
pollution permits giving them the right to generate such emissions. In eﬀect, these
policies transfer property rights from ﬁrms to the public sector, reclaiming from ﬁrms
the ownership of environmental resources such as air quality. The changes in property
rights can have substantial distributional impacts and can thus generate considerable
political opposition from the adversely aﬀected parties.
To the extent that industrial stakeholders wield substantial political power, designing
policies that achieve environmental goals while avoiding serious adverse impacts on key
industries can enhance political feasibility.2 One way to reduce the burden on the
polluting industries is to allow ﬁrms to retain a portion of the potential revenues. For
1The signiﬁcant inﬂuence of industry groups in the political process can be explained in various
ways. One inﬂuential explanation was articulated by Mancur Olson (1965), who argued that the degree
of political mobilization of interest groups depends on the concentration of the impact of the potential
policy. Concentrated potential costs alleviate free-rider problems in lobbying eﬀorts and thus may result
in signiﬁcant contributions of time and other resources to become engaged in the political process. If
costs are suﬃciently concentrated relative to beneﬁts, therefore, the agents who would face these costs
can exert greater inﬂuence on the political process than those who would enjoy the widely dispersed
beneﬁts and thus face more serious free-rider problems. This holds even if aggregate beneﬁts exceed
aggregate costs.
2Shifting the burden in this way oﬀers potential attractions beyond political feasibility. To the extent
that the government avoids producing unexpected adverse distributional impacts in its environmental2
example, the government could introduce a system of tradable permits in which permits
are not auctioned but instead are given out free (or “grandfathered”) on the basis of
historical presence in the aﬀected industry. In this case, regulated ﬁrms retain as rents
what otherwise would have become government revenue from the sale of permits. Firms
pay only for whatever pollution they would produce beyond what is implied by their
initial permit allotment. Likewise, the government could introduce an emissions tax
policy with an exemption for some inframarginal emissions. Here ﬁrms retain as rent
what would otherwise have been a tax payment for inframarginal emissions.
These policies suﬀer little or no disadvantage on environmental grounds. Firms
continue to face higher costs for pollution at the margin — each additional unit of pollu-
tion requires either the purchase of an additional permit or an increase in the pollution
tax payment — and thus they are encouraged to cut pollution. But insulating ﬁrms
through grandfathering of permits or exemptions to emissions taxes carries an eﬃciency
cost because the government forgoes permit revenue or emission-tax revenue and thus
must rely more on ordinary distortionary taxes (such as income or sales taxes) to raise
revenues. This reduces eﬃciency because the foregone revenue is inframarginal and
therefore would have yielded revenue at lower eﬃciency cost than ordinary taxes.3 Al-
leviating the adverse distributional impact on particular polluting ﬁr m st h u sc o m e sa t
a cost in terms of eﬃciency.4
This paper examines the eﬃciency costs of avoiding adverse industry-distributional
eﬀects under environmental taxes and quotas. We identify the determinants of the added
cost relative to the cost in the absence of a constraint on distributional impacts. Related
to this added cost is the compensation ratio — the share of potential revenue that the
government must forego to protect the industries in question. We distinguish gross and
net compensation ratios, where the net ratio takes account of the policy’s adverse impact
on the revenue yield from existing distortionary taxes and thus provides information
on the capacity of policies to raise net revenues.5 We examine how these ratios are
inititatives, it helps to ensure stable property right sa n dt h e r e b yc u l t i v a t e sar e p u t a t i o na sa ni m p a r t i a l
guardian of investors’ rights. This can enhance the investment climate and dynamic eﬃciency.
3This eﬃciency issue has been explored in previous papers comparing the costs of policies that diﬀer
in terms of whether they charge for inframarginal emissions. See, for example, Goulder et al. (1999)
and Fullerton and Metcalf (2001).
4There would be little or no added eﬃciency cost if the government could obtain the foregone revenue
through lump-sum taxes or some other tax which, if increased, would reduce overall distortions of the
tax system.
5The reduction in revenue-yield reﬂects the policy-induced erosion of the factor tax base (reduction
in factor supply). Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) consider the signiﬁcance of this phenomenon.3
inﬂuenced by the stringency of the environmental policy, the production technology,
and demand.
We investigate these issues using a general framework that can consider a wide range
of pollution-control settings. Earlier work by Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), by Smith,
Ross, and Montgomery (2002), and by Burtraw et al. (2002) investigated these issues in
the context of CO2 emissions policy.6 The present investigation generalizes the earlier
work in several ways. First, we extend the analysis to make it applicable not only to CO2
but to other forms of pollution as well. In the earlier studies, demanders of pollution-
related (namely, fossil) fuels could reduce the emissions-output ratio only through input-
substitution (for example, switching from coal to natural gas). This restriction is
appropriate when the focus is on CO2 emission-reductions, since at present7 input-
substitution appears to be the only signiﬁcant channel for reducing the CO2 emissions-
output ratio. However, end-of-pipe treatment – the installation of equipment to ﬁlter,
treat, or remove emissions as they move through the smokestack – is an important
channel through which other pollutants can be reduced. This study considers this
additional channel as well, and thus we are able to apply our model to policies aimed
at other pollutants besides CO2.
A second diﬀerence is that we employ both analytical and numerical models to
generate our results: the previous studies applied only a numerical model. Our analyt-
ical model enables us to obtain general results regarding the determinants of eﬃciency
impacts and the distribution of policy costs. These results are then evaluated quanti-
tatively with the numerical model.
A third diﬀerence is the integrated focus on downstream and upstream pollution-
generating industries. While the previous Bovenberg-Goulder study concentrated on
the problem of avoiding adverse impacts on “upstream” industries – the industries that
supply fossil fuels – here we consider in addition the downstream industries, that is, the
industries that utilize the fuels or other inputs associated with pollution. “Downstream
policies” are a central feature of several recent legislative proposals. The Bush Adminis-
tration, Senator James Jeﬀords, and Senator Thomas Carper have each introduced bills
to “cap and trade” emissions of various pollutants from U.S. electric power plants. The
6For an excellent review of compensation issues in the context of U.S. CO2 policy, see Dinan (2003).
7Scientists currently are investigating possibilities for end-of-pipe treatment of carbon dioxide emis-
sions through carbon separation and geological sequestration. Eventually this may emerge as a signiﬁ-
cant channel for CO2 emissions reduction. At present, however, this approach is very costly and it has
been applied only on a very limited basis. See Anderson and Newell (2003).4
Administration bill applies to sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury; the other
two bills target these emissions and carbon dioxide as well. In addition, the European
Union is committed to introducing, on a Europe-wide basis, a system of tradable per-
mits applied to several downstream industries, including electric power, steel, cement,
and aluminum manufacturing.
We ﬁnd, in both models, that the eﬃciency cost from the compensation constraint
rises with the extent of required pollution abatement. However, as the abatement
requirement becomes more extensive, the cost of this constraint diminishes relative to
the other eﬃciency costs of pollution-control. The degree of availability of end-of-pipe
treatment can signiﬁcantly reduce overall policy costs in absolute terms. At the same
time, the availability of such treatment has little impact on the relative increase in
eﬃciency cost imposed by the compensation constraint.
We also ﬁnd that both the gross and net compensation ratios rise with the extent
of required pollution abatement. In numerical simulations of sulfur dioxide pollution-
control, the gross compensation ratio tends to rise fairly slowly with abatement. Unless
required abatement exceeds 75 percent, compensating the electric utilities industry re-
quires free allocation of less than 50 percent of emissions permits. Numerical simulations
of sulfur dioxide pollution-control suggest that the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies
Initiative would exceed this ratio, freely allocating more permits than necessary to pre-
serve proﬁts. Our models also highlight signiﬁcant diﬀerences between gross and net
policy revenues: when abatement is extensive, a large fraction of the revenue collected
from emissions permits or taxes is oﬀset by the revenue-loss from erosion of the base of
existing factor taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the
analytical model and derives and interprets its results. The analytical results stem from
linear approximations; hence they are not necessarily valid for large policy changes. In
addition, the analytical model assumes that the regulated pollution-supplying industries
are very small compared to the economy as a whole, so that general equilibrium eﬀects
on the prices of mobile production factors can be ignored. Section III describes and
applies a numerical model, whose results extend and quantify those of the analytical
model. Since its solution does not require linear approximations, the numerical model
is capable of investigating large policy changes. And because it relaxes the assumption
that the regulated industries are small, this model allows for an assessment of general
equilibrium eﬀects. Section IV oﬀers conclusions. The appendix provides details on
the analytical solution.5
2A n A n a l y t i c a l M o d e l
We develop a simple equilibrium model aimed at capturing the impact of environmental
policy on an “upstream” industry supplying a pollution-generating product (e.g., a fuel)
and a “downstream” industry demanding that product as an intermediate input.
There are two primary factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). Capital is
treated as imperfectly mobile across industries, labor as perfectly mobile. The model
distinguishes three industries: the upstream industry, which produces an intermediate
good X associated with pollution, the downstream industry, which produces a ﬁnal
good Y , and the “other good” industry, which produces another ﬁnal good C enjoyed
by consumers.
The downstream industry produces pollution emissions E when it uses the inter-
mediate input X produced by the upstream industry. The downstream industry can
inﬂuence the amount of pollution it generates both by changing its input mix (substi-
tuting other factors for X) and by engaging in end-of-pipe treatment.
A representative household’s utility is a positive function of its consumption of Y
and C and a negative function of its factor supplies and the economy’s total emissions
E.
2.1 Production
The upstream industry produces the intermediate good X according to the following
constant-returns-to-scale production function
X = fx(Lx,K x), (1)
where Lx denotes employment in the upstream industry and Kx stands for the capital









where Px denotes the price of the intermediate good, W the wage rate, and Rx is the
rental rate of capital in the upstream sector. Since capital is imperfectly mobile, the
rental rate can diﬀer across industries. The wage rate, in contrast, is the same in both
industries in keeping with the assumption of perfectly mobile labor.6
The downstream industry produces the ﬁnal good Y . This industry is the only
source of demand for the output of the upstream industry. The constant-returns-to-
scale production function of the downstream industry is given by
Y = fy(Ky,X,L y)=h(v(Ky;X);Ly), (4)
where Ly stands for employment engaged in production in the downstream industry and
Ky is the capital stock in that industry. The production function is weakly separable.
In particular, the substitution elasticity between the intermediate input X and capital
Ky does not depend on industry-speciﬁce m p l o y m e n tLy; the intermediate input and
capital ﬁr s ty i e l dt h ec o m p o s i t ev(Ky;X), which in turn is combined with labor to yield
output Y.
The use of the intermediate input by the downstream industry causes pollution. This
pollution can be reduced, however, by devoting resources to “end-of-pipe” treatment.
Emissions, E, are given by
E = e(X,g(Ca;Ya)), (5)
with de/dX ≥ 0; de/dg ≤ 0;dg/dCa ≥ 0;dg/dYa ≥ 0. The subfunction g is a composite
of the two ﬁnal goods Ca and Ya; it is an index of resources devoted to end-of-pipe
treatment.8 The downstream industry can thus reduce emissions per unit of output
through either input substitution or end-of-pipe treatment.
Pure proﬁts in the downstream industry are given by PyY − PxX − TeE − WLy −
PcCa − PyYa − RyKy, where Py represents the price of the ﬁnal good produced by the
downstream industry, Pc the price of the other, clean ﬁnal good, Ry the rental rate of
capital in the downstream industry, and Te the opportunity costs of emissions. This
latter shadow cost can be interpreted as the tax rate on emissions. The downstream
industry maximizes proﬁts taking prices as given.9
2.2 Supply of primary factors
We employ the following transformation function to formalize the supply of sector-
speciﬁc capital services
k(Kx;Ky;Kc)=K, (6)
8The emissions function e(., . ) and the function g(.,.) exhibit constant returns to scale in their
arguments. The function g(.,.) also aggregates the goods C and Y in the utility function (see (8)
below).
9For the ﬁrst-order conditions, see the Appendix.7
where K represents the economy-wide stock of capital and Kc stands for the capital
stock in the “rest of the economy” (that is, the economy except for the upstream and
downstream industries). The capital stock Kc is used to produce a clean ﬁnal good
C — the other ﬁnal good in the economy. We capture imperfect mobility of capital
(i.e., capital adjustment costs) by assuming that the substitution elasticities between
the three types of capital are less than inﬁnite.10
With perfectly mobile labor, labor market equilibrium is given by
L = Lx + Ly + Lc, (7)
where L and Lc respectively represent aggregate labor supply and labor employed in the
sector producing the clean ﬁnal good C.
2.3 Household utility
Households obtain utility from consumption of Y and C. Aggregate emissions E, labor
supply L, and capital supply K produce disutility.11 Households choose Y and C to
maximize the utility function








δz > 0, δw
δE, δz
δL, δz
δK < 0. Since the utility function is weakly separable
in environmental quality, such quality does not directly aﬀect household decisions.12
Households collect labor income, which is taxed at a proportional rate T,and capital
income, which is taxed at the same proportional tax rate T. Uniform tax rates on capital
10The supply function can be interpreted as a multi-product ﬁrm that uses aggregate capital as an
input to produce three outputs: namely, the three capital stocks Ki (i = x,y,c).
11In a fully dynamic model, the cost of supplying capital is current consumption foregone when
resources are devoted to investment instead of consumption. We include capital in the utility function
to account for the cost of capital supply in our static model, which does not deal with investment
explicitly. An alternative interpretation of K is as a production factor (like labor or entrepreneurship)
that is imperfectly mobile across sectors. In this interpretation, L is the mobile factor and K is the
imperfectly mobile factor.
12A more general formulation would relax the assumption of separability between environmental qual-
ity and other goods in utility. Empirical work exploits non-separabilities to gauge the value of envi-
ronmental quality based on demands for marketed goods (see, for example, Freeman (1993) and Smith
(2000)). It is not clear in which direction the assumption of separability might bias the results. The
eﬃciency cost estimates of environmental policy presented below are biased upward (downward) to the
extent that environmental quality reduces (raises) the marginal disutility of factor supply compared to
the marginal utility of ﬁnal consumption of produced commodities.8
and labor income are optimal, given that capital and labor are weakly separable in utility
from consumption.
In what follows we apply two concepts for measuring the eﬃciency costs of distor-
tionary taxation. The ﬁrst, the marginal cost of public funds, is denoted by λ and is




1 − εu[T/(1 − T)]
¶
, (9)
where εu denotes the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply.13 The marginal
cost of public funds represents the cost in terms of household income of raising one
additional dollar of government revenue spent on public goods that are separable in
utility from private goods (so that public expenditure does not impact marginal rates
of substitution in utility).
A related cost concept, the marginal excess burden, applies in case where the revenue
is not spent on public goods but rather is returned to households as lump-sum transfers.





1 − εu[T/(1 − T)]
¶
, (10)
where εc stands for the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply. As mentioned
above, we assume that initial tax system is optimal from a non-environmental point of
view so that marginal excess burden of the capital tax is the same as that of the labor
tax.14
2.4 Equilibrium
For small policy shocks, the model can be solved analytically by log-linearizing it around
its initial equilibrium. Unless indicated otherwise, small letters stand for relative (per-
centage) changes of the variables denoted by the corresponding capital letters. Greek
letters represent either elasticities or shares in the initial equilibrium. In solving the
13This is the partial equilibrium concept of the marginal cost of public funds because it does not take
into account the indirect eﬀect of a higher labor tax on emissions and emissions tax revenue. This partial
equilibrium concept is appropriate if the pollution sectors are inﬁnitely small compared to the rest of
the economy. This is indeed what the solution to the analytical model assumes (see next sub-section).
14The expressions for λ and µ therefore do not distinguish between the supply elasticities of capital
(the immobile factor) and labor (the mobile factor). Indeed, the elasticities of aggregate capital supply
coincide with the corresponding labor supply elasticities.9
model, we assume that the upstream and downstream industries are small compared to
the rest of the economy. This enables us to ignore eﬀects on the real wage rate W/Pc
when solving for output and emissions in the upstream and downstream industries.15
We adopt Pc as the numeraire.
2.4.1 Upstream Industry
Details of the solution are in the appendix. As indicated there, the demand for the















xte represents the relative change in the demand price of the output of
the upstream industry (i.e., the price that the downstream industry has to pay for this
input), and where α
y
x ≡ PxX/PyY and α
y
e ≡ TeE/PyY 16 respectively stand for the
intermediate good’s cost share in the downstream industry and the emissions tax’s cost
share in that industry. The parameter εx
d ≥ 0 denotes the (absolute value of) price
elasticity of demand for the intermediate good. The appendix derives the determinants
of this demand elasticity.17
The supply of the output of the upstream industry is given by
xs = εx
spx, (12)
where the price elasticity of supply εx
s depends on the intersectoral mobility of production
factors (see the appendix).18
15We relax this assumption in the numerical model below. When computing aggregate welfare eﬀects,
the analytical model accounts for the impact of changes in net factor prices on taxed factor supplies.
Although the relative changes in net factor prices and thus factor supplies are inﬁnitesimal, they apply
to a very large tax base (in comparison with the base of the environmental tax) and thus cannot be
ignored when computing aggregate welfare eﬀects.
16I nt h ee x p r e s s i o n sb e l o w ,t h ec h a n g ei nt h et a xr a t ete always appears together with the cost share






PyY . This product is thus well deﬁned also if the initial emission tax,
Te, is zero.
17Speciﬁcally, a higher price of the intermediate good depresses the demand for the intermediate good
through two channels: a negative substitution eﬀect and a negative “scale” eﬀect on the output of
the downstream sector. The substitution eﬀect depends on how easily the downstream industry can
substitute capital for the polluting intermediate input in (4). The scale eﬀect rises with the cost share
of the intermediate input α
y
x and demand and supply elasticities of the ﬁnal good Y produced by the
downstream industry.
18This elasticity becomes inﬁnite if capital (i.e., the imperfectly mobile factor) does not play a role in10
Setting the demand for the upstream industry’s output equal to its supply, we arrive


































The emissions tax will not precipitate much of a decline in the supply price if εx
d is small
compared with εx
s. In this case, the demand price rises signiﬁcantly and most of the
tax burden falls on the demander of X, the downstream industry. Output of X falls by
a greater amount, the larger are the demand and supply elasticities.
2.4.2 Downstream Industry
The impact on the price of the output of the downstream industry is given by (see the



































d represent the supply and (the absolute value of) the demand elasticity
for the downstream industry (deﬁned in the appendix). Demanders of the ﬁnal output
thus bear a large share of the burden of the environmental tax if supply is relatively
elastic in both the upstream and downstream industries. In that case, a large share of
the tax burden is shifted forward unto demanders.



































where σe stands for the elasticity of substitution between X and g(Ca;Ya) in the emission
function (5) and α
y
k ≡ RyKy/(RyKy + PxX + TeE + PcCa + PyYa) and α
y
v ≡ (RyKy +
PxX + TeE + PcCa + PyYa)/PyY =1− (WLy/PyY ). On the right-hand side of (16),
the ﬁrst term within the square brackets stands for the negative eﬀect of a pollution
production of Y , if such capital is a perfect substitute for capital in the rest of the economy (i.e., the
transformation curve (6) is linear), or if mobile labor is a perfect substitute for this capital in (1). In all
these cases, the imperfectly mobile factor does not constrain production of the ﬁnal good.11
tax on the output X from the upstream industry (compare (14)). The second term in
the square brackets captures the impact of end-of-pipe treatment. Inverting (16) yields
the mapping between required pollution abatement a (≡− e)a n dt h ep o l l u t i o nt a xte.
Applying this mapping, we obtain the following relationship between α
y
ete, the required
cost-increase (relative to the initial demand price of X), and the mandated reduction in
emissions:
αy
ete = κa, (17)
































. The left-hand side of the above equa-
tion represents the policy-induced increase in the cost of producing Y . The denominator
in the deﬁnition of κ incorporates the various channels through which emissions can be
cut, namely: (i) abatement (which is the second term in the denominator), (ii) output
of the ﬁn a lg o o d( w h i c hi si m p l i c i ti nεx
d, see appendix), and (iii) input substitution
between capital and the intermediate input in the downstream industry (also this is
implicit in the deﬁnition of εx
d). The emission cost increase α
y
ete required to attain a
certain emission cut falls as these three channels become more eﬀective.
2.5 Equity value neutrality
We deﬁne a policy as achieving equity value neutrality (EVN) for an industry if it
provides compensation just suﬃcient to oﬀset what otherwise would be the loss of income
for the imperfectly mobile factor (capital) employed in that industry. One indicator
of required compensation is the share of potential revenues from a pollution tax or
(auctioned) emissions permits that would need to be left with ﬁrms (foregone by the
government) in order to achieve equity value neutrality.
2.5.1 Gross potential revenues and compensation ratios
The product TeE represents the gross potential revenues from pollution taxes. This is
a gross concept because it does not net out any oﬀsetting revenue loss due to an erosion
of the labor or capital tax base. Let trg refer to the change in gross potential revenues
from an incremental change in the pollution tax (expressed relative to the initial output





e(te + e)=[ κ − αy
e]a. (18)12
Under competitive auctioning of pollution permits, the revenue from the auction
equals the revenues obtained from a pollution tax that achieves the same pollution
reduction. Thus an equivalent measure of the need for compensation is the share of
potential revenues from an emissions permit program that must be left with ﬁrms rather
than collected. This, in turn, is the same as the share of the permits that must be
freely allocated (or grandfathered) to existing ﬁrms. We refer to this share as the gross
compensation ratio. This ratio is in gross terms because we measure the compensation
compared to the gross revenues, that is, prior to netting out any revenue losses from
the erosion of distortionary tax bases. We begin by examining this ratio or share as
applied to the upstream industry; we then consider the required ratio for the downstream
industry.
Let θg
x represent the gross compensation ratio in the upstream industry. This share












This expression indicates that θg
x is smaller, the larger the supply elasticity εx
s or the
smaller (in absolute value) the demand elasticity εx
d. The supply elasticity is large if
immobile factors are relatively unimportant in that industry so that proﬁts account only
for a small share of the value of the industry’s output in the initial equilibrium. In that
case, not much compensation (relative to potential revenues) is needed. Expression (19)
indicates also that the compensation ratio will be small if the environmental policy is not
very stringent: small values of revenues from the emission tax, α
y
e, imply low values for
θg
x. Intuitively, small levels for the share α
y
e imply that a more ambitious environmental
policy yields substantial additional gross revenues because pollution abatement does not
erode the base of the environmental tax much.
In some circumstances the gross compensation ratio θg
x can exceed unity. This
occurs if initial environmental policy is stringent (i.e., if α
y
e is large) and supply elastic-
ities are small compared to demand elasticities (i.e., if εx
s/εx
d is small). Intuitively, an
ambitious environmental policy yields relatively large abatement costs, while relatively
small supply elasticities imply that producers bear a large fraction of these costs. If θg
x
exceeds unity, freely allocating 100 percent of the permits (and enabling ﬁrms to retain
100 percent of the rents) is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the gross loss of capital returns in X-
producing ﬁrms. Under these circumstances, achieving equity value neutrality compels
the government to provide further compensation.13























This ratio will tend to be small if environmental policy is not ambitious or if supply is
more inelastic in the upstream than in the downstream industry. For the ﬁrst increment
to abatement (that is, evaluating (20) when α
y
e =0 ) , the ease of end-of-pipe abatement
(a larger value for σe)d o e sn o ta ﬀect the compensation ratio. The reason is that
easier end-of-pipe treatment reduces both the burden on downstream industry (the
numerator) and the collected revenues (the denominator). However, for any further
increments to abatement, ease of end-of-pipe treatment generally will have an eﬀect
on the compensation ratio θg
y, although its direction is theoretically ambiguous. The
ambiguity reﬂects the fact that σe exerts two opposing eﬀects on the potential revenues
from the environmental policy. On the one hand, a higher σe means that, to achieve
a given reduction in emissions, the emissions tax rate (or permit price) has to rise
less (implying a smaller value for κ and thus α
y
ete). This reduces potential revenues
and thus raises the compensation ratio. On the other hand, because the emissions
tax need not be so high, there is less erosion of the environmental tax base (the share
α
y
e = TeE/PyY declines). This exerts a positive impact on potential revenues and
thus reduces the compensation ratio. At low, but non-marginal levels of abatement, the
ﬁrst eﬀect dominates; at high levels of abatement, the second eﬀect may (but does not
necessarily) dominate.
2.5.2 Net potential revenues and compensation ratios
We can also compute the net potential revenues from the pollution tax. This net
concept, trn, takes account of the erosion of the bases of distortionary taxes on the
production factors (see the appendix for the second equality):
trn ≡ Tq+ αy
e(te(1 − T)+e)=αy
e[te(1 − T)+λe] − µ(1 − T)π, (21)
where π is the required lump-sum compensation (before factor taxes) of the polluting
industries to achieve equity value neutrality (again expressed relative to the initial output
of the downstream industry Y ), q is the change in aggregate factor supply (expressed
relative to the initial output of the downstream industry Y ), and T is the initial factor
tax. The second equality assumes that the government employs the distortionary tax
on labor and capital incomes, T, to balance the government budget.14
The net compensation ratio indicates the share of net potential permit or emissions
tax revenue that must be devoted to compensation. It is a net concept for two reasons.
First, potential revenue (the denominator of the ratio) is here deﬁned as net of any
revenue-losses stemming from the policy’s adverse eﬀect on the base of existing taxes,
such as income or factor taxes. To the extent that the environmental policy reduces
incomes, this tax base is reduced. In addition, the required compensation (the numera-
tor) is net of any income taxes on such compensation. A net compensation ratio above
100 percent indicates that, after compensation, the environmental policy loses revenue.
The net compensation ratio does not correspond to the share of permits that must be
freely allocated to achieve equity value neutrality: that correspondence applies to the
gross compensation ratio only.

































































With positive initial factor taxes T>0 and a positive uncompensated wage elasticity of
labor supply εu, the net ratios exceed the corresponding gross ratios.20 The reason is
that the net compensation ratios account for the erosion of the base of the distortionary
factor tax as a result of tighter environmental policy. Hence a larger share of the
remaining tax revenue must be earmarked for compensation.
2.5.3 Eﬃciency impacts
We deﬁne the non-environmental welfare impact ψ as the eﬃciency impact from the pol-
icy change, excluding the welfare eﬀects from changes in environmental quality. This
19The compensation in the numerator of this ratio is computed net of the factor tax revenue that the
government collects on the compensation. Hence, with π denoting gross compensation, net compensa-
tion is computed as (1 − T)π.
20The denominators in (22) and (23) are smaller than the denominators in (19) and (20) if T,εu > 0.
This is because T,εu > 0 implies that λ > 1 (see (9)) and µ>0 (see (10)). In particular, the (in
absolute value) larger second term in the denominators of (22) and (23) stands for the factor-tax-base
erosion as a result of abatement costs associated with environmental policy. This term is relevant only if
environmental policy yields ﬁrst-order costs (i.e. if Te > 0 and thus α
y
e > 0). The third term represents
the erosion of the factor tax base as a result of the required lump-sum compensation. This compensation
is ﬁnanced through higher distortionary taxes, which harm factor supply and thus erode the base of the
factor tax T.15
consists of the economy-wide changes in producer surplus, consumer surplus, and tax-
payer surplus. The following equation (derived in the appendix) expresses ψ as a function






ee − µπ(1 − T). (24)
The above expression is general in that it applies for any value of compensation and
does not depend on which industry’s capital owners are compensated. In the partic-
ular case where compensation is provided to capital owners in both the upstream and
downstream industries, and where the compensation is just suﬃcient to achieve equity
value neutrality, the non-environmental welfare impact (expressed relative to required
abatement) can be written as:
ψ/a ≡− λαy




















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this expression stands for the non-environmental
costs of the erosion of the base of both the environmental tax and the factor taxes.
This cost exceeds the direct costs α
y
e (i.e. the erosion of the environmental tax) if the
marginal cost of public funds exceeds unity (i.e., if εuT>0 so that λ > 1). Intuitively,
the government has to raise the distortionary tax T to compensate the revenue loss
resulting from the erosion of the base of this tax.
The second term on the right-hand side is the cost of providing lump-sum compen-
sation to capital owners in the polluting industries. This additional cost is substantial if
a large share of the environmental policy costs α
y
ete is borne by capital owners in these
two industries rather than the consumers of the ﬁnal good Y . This will be the case if
production factors are particularly immobile (so that εx
s and ε
y
s are small) and Y is a
good substitute for C in utility (so that ε
y
d is large). The need to compensate capital
owners implies that the government forgoes some of the revenue it could have obtained
through auctioning of pollution permits. This would be an eﬃcient source of revenue,
since it is inframarginal. Instead, the government must depend more on ordinary dis-
tortionary taxes. As a result, the overall economic cost of a given environmental tax or
quota policy is higher than it would be without the EVN requirement.
Let χ represent the ratio of the two terms at the right-hand sides of (24) and (25).
This ratio is the additional eﬃciency cost of achieving equity value neutrality, relative
to the marginal eﬃciency cost of achieving environmental improvement in the absence16




















































The additional eﬃciency losses are substantial if distortionary taxes T are large and
compensated wage elasticities of labor supply are large. In that case, ﬁnancing lump-
sum subsidies to compensate capital owners is costly. The additional eﬃciency losses
are also large if owners of capital in the pollution-associated industries cannot shift the
tax burden onto consumers of the ﬁnal good (i.e., if εx
s and ε
y




d) so that sector-speciﬁc factors pay a large part of the burden of the emission
tax. Another key factor is the parameter κ : the larger the required cost increase α
y
ete
(part of which must be compensated through lump-sum transfers) to arrive at a given
emission cut a, the larger the additional eﬃciency losses of establishing equity value
neutrality becomes.
Let the initial level of abatement refer to the amount of abatement from which one
examines the cost of additional abatement. The abatement ratio χ is lower, the higher
is this initial level or starting point. This is the case because higher initial abatement




If the initial level of abatement is zero, the implicit emission tax rate is zero, i.e., Te =
α
y
e =0 . Starting from this initial level, the eﬃciency cost of lump-sum compensation
is ﬁrst-order, while the other element of eﬃciency cost — the economy-wide incremental
cost of abatement (in terms of erosion of the environmental tax base) — is only second-
order.21 Hence at low levels of initial abatement, the eﬃciency costs associated with
distribution dominate the other (economy-wide) eﬃciency costs. Indeed, initially, χ
is inﬁnite. At higher initial levels of abatement, the marginal economy-wide costs are
positive. As a function of the initial abatement level, these costs typically rise faster
than the marginal costs of the needed lump-sum compensation. In contrast to the
economy-wide marginal costs of abatement, the eﬃciency costs of compensation do not
directly depend on the initial abatement level. Hence, as emissions-reductions become
21To gain intuition for the second-order nature of the economy-wide eﬃciency cost, one might note
that, in the regulated industry, the Harberger triangle associated with diﬀerences between private mar-
ginal cost and private marginal beneﬁt (demand) vanishes as the level of abatement approaches zero.
Even as abatement approaches zero, second-best “tax-interaction” and “revenue-recycling” eﬀects can be
“large.” However, these second-best eﬀects cancel out as abatement approaches zero (see, for example,
Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002).17
more extensive, the marginal costs of additional compensation become smaller compared
to marginal economy-wide costs. At high levels of pollution abatement, pure eﬃciency
costs of abatement, which are borne by the economy as a whole in terms of a smaller
cut in factor taxes, tend to dominate the eﬃciency costs associated with redistribution.
As with its impact on the compensation ratios, the eﬀect of ease of end-of-pipe
treatment σe on the additional eﬃciency cost of achieving equity value neutrality χ is
ambiguous. Easier abatement reduces both the required compensation for the aﬀected
industries (and thus also the eﬃciency costs of establishing equity neutrality) and the
economy-wide costs of abatement. At low, non-marginal levels of abatement (i.e., at
low values for α
y
e),t h eﬁrst eﬀect tends to dominate but at higher levels the second eﬀect
may be stronger.
2.5.4 A graphical illustration
Figure 1 heuristically illustrates some of the main results from this section, with a focus
on the downstream industry. Suppose that the government constrains emissions through
pollution permits, and that all permits are auctioned. In this case the cost of producing
Y increases because the input X eﬀectively becomes more costly: the purchase of
each unit of X now requires also the purchase of permits for the emissions associated
with X. Producers of Y may mitigate this cost-increase through expenditures on end-
of-pipe treatment, which reduces the emissions associated with X, but the industry still
faces an increase in cost because of required permit purchase and the cost of end-of-pipe
treatment. Hence the industry’s supply curve shifts up from S0 to S1.T h i s i m p l i e s a
gross loss of producer surplus of cihd,w h i c hi st h ed i ﬀerence between original producer
surplus (cie) and the post-policy producer surplus (dhe).
Now if instead the same number of permits are given out free rather than auctioned,
producers receiving the permits will not have to pay the extra amount for each unit
of Y produced. Production up to Q1 can be supplied according to the original supply
curve S0. However, production at the margin (that is, beyond Q1) still requires the
purchase of permits, and thus involves the extra cost. Hence beyond Q1 the applicable
supply curve is S1. Thus the equilibrium output price is a, as in the case of auctioned
permits. Recipients of free permits enjoy the beneﬁts of a higher output price (a instead
of c), yet they do not face the higher costs. These producers earn rents given by the
area bfhe, which equals the rectangular area afhd when the marginal cost increase is
uniform across output. As drawn, these rents more than compensate for the gross loss18
of producer surplus.
The rectangle afhd represents what we have termed the gross potential revenues
from the environmental policy. To achieve equity value neutrality, the government
would need to leave ﬁrms with a large enough share of these potential revenues to
oﬀset the gross loss of producer surplus cihd. In the diagram, this share (or gross
compensation ratio) is about 25 percent. The reader can conﬁrm from the diagram
that this share is larger, the greater (in absolute value) the elasticity of demand and the
smaller the elasticity of supply for Y .
T h ee a s eo fe n d - o f - p i p et r e a t m e n ta ﬀects the magnitude of the rents and the com-
pensation ratio. Easier end-of-pipe treatment implies that ﬁrms will rely more heavily
on such treatment per unit of output. Firms’ marginal costs of achieving emissions
reductions will be lower, and thus for any given abatement target (or number of permits
in circulation), the permit price will be lower. Hence the upward shift in the supply
curve will be smaller than when end-of-pipe treatment is more costly. The smaller
rise in the supply curve has two eﬀects. First, it implies that the gross loss of pro-
ducer surplus will not be so large, which diminishes the numerator of the compensation
ratio. In addition, the smaller upward shift aﬀects the potential revenues from the
policy change. Depending on supply and demand elasticities, the potential revenues
(represented by the rectangle afhd in the diagram) may be larger or smaller than in
t h ec a s ew h e r ee n d - o f - p i p et r e a t m e n ti sm o r ecostly. Thus, as discussed in connection
with equation (20) above, the implication of end-of-pipe treatment for the compensation
ratio is theoretically ambiguous.
3A N u m e r i c a l M o d e l
Here we develop and apply a numerical model in order to obtain quantitative results
and consider the impacts of large policy changes.
3.1 Structure
We brieﬂy describe the model here; a complete description is in a technical appendix,
available from www.stanford.edu/˜goulder/BGGNumericalDoc-Web.pdf. The formal
structure of the numerical model and its degree of aggregation match that of the an-
alytical model described in the previous section. However, this model relaxes the19
assumption that the industries X and Y are “small,” thus allowing the real wage to be
endogenous. Moreover, since the model is solved numerically, its solution does not rely
on linearization techniques. Hence this model can consider general equilibrium impacts
and large policy changes.
The model adopts constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functional forms for the
production functions of the intermediate input X and the ﬁnal goods Y and C.A s i n
the analytical model, each industry employs labor and capital as inputs, and industry
Y employs the intermediate input X as well (with the same nesting as in the analytical









































where K represents the aggregate capital stock. The parameter σk controls the cur-
vature of this function. We employ negative values for σk so that the transformation
function is bowed out from the origin. Successive increments to the supply of any given
type of capital thus require ever-larger sacriﬁces of other types of capital, in keeping
with increasing marginal adjustment costs. In contrast to capital, labor is perfectly
mobile across industries.
































and where L and K represent the maximum potential labor supply (endowment of labor
time) and capital supply, respectively.











βe > 0; 0 < ρe < 1 (33)
where end-of-pipe abatement Ga is a CES composite of the two ﬁnal goods C and Y,
with the same parameters as in (31).
The emission function E/X can be represented as γef(Ga/X). The function f(.)
features the following desirable properties:
• f0(0) ⇒− ∞ .T h i s ﬁrst unit of end-of-pipe treatment is very productive in
cutting emissions. Accordingly, end-of-pipe treatment is positive if emissions are
constrained (implying a positive shadow price of pollution permits)
• f(∞)=0 . Pollution is eliminated completely if end-of-pipe treatment is very
large.
• f(0) = 1. Without any end-of-pipe treatment, pollution remains ﬁnite.
3.2 Equilibrium
The requirements of the general equilibrium are that (1) household supply of labor
must equal aggregate labor demand by ﬁrms, (2) demand for capital by each industry i
(i = x,y,c) must equal the quantity supplied to that industry, (3) pollution emissions
must equal the pollution level stipulated by environmental policy, and (4) government
revenue must equal real transfers to households.
The nominal price of labor is the numeraire. The primary prices in the model
(from which all other prices can be determined) are the rental prices of capital (Rki,
i = x,y,c), the price of pollution permits, and the tax on factor income.22 To obtain
the general equilibrium, the model identiﬁes the vector of primary prices that meet the
22As indicated in the next subsection, in some policy experiments we require that real government
revenue (and transfers) remain constant. Under these policies, we adjust marginal factor tax rates
to oﬀset any new revenue resulting from the introduction of pollution taxes. In other policy exper-
iments, we do not oﬀset the increase in government revenue from environmental taxes. Under these
policies government budget balance is achieved through increases in transfers that match the increase
in government revenue.21
four requirements above. Walras’s law implies that the labor market clears when the
all other markets clear.
Some experiments add the requirement of equity value neutrality for the downstream
industry, the upstream industry, or both. In these cases we require, for the industry
or industries involved, that the number of freely allocated permits be just suﬃcient to
prevent a loss of proﬁt rates for the owners of the initial (i.e., pre-policy-change) capital
stock. The extent of grandfathering aﬀects the revenue yield from the policy and thus
the extent of revenue recycling. Hence, when we impose the equity value neutrality
requirement, the solution algorithm solves simultaneously for primary prices and the
required extent of grandfathering.
3.3 Data
The numerical model is applied to the U.S. We choose the electricity industry as the
downstream industry and regard the suppliers of fossil fuels to this industry as the
upstream industry. We focus on control of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions.
Table 1 indicates the inter-industry ﬂows in our data set. These ﬂows derive from
the U.S. Commerce Department Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Benchmark Input &
Output Tables for 1992. The emissions data come from the 1992 column of Table 12.6
of the Energy Information Agency’s Annual Energy Review 1999.
Table 2 indicates the parameters used in the model. The elasticities of substitution
in production are taken from the disaggregated general equilibrium data set developed
by Barreto, Gurney, Xie, and Goulder (2002). For the Y industry, we calibrate the
model to generate production and abatement elasticities consistent with those from the
detailed “HAIKU” model of the U.S. electricity industry developed at Resources for the
Future. The substitution elasticities σy and σv imply that, compared to capital, labor
is a much better substitute for X.
The capital adjustment parameter σk is chosen so as to yield capital responses
roughly consistent with ﬁndings from a recent survey by Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer
(2002) indicating that the elasticity of investment with respect to the cost of capital is
in the range of .25-.4.
We calibrate the model to generate uncompensated and compensated labor supply
elasticities of 0.15 and 0.4, respectively.23 This is consistent with the survey by Russek
23To calibrate the model to these labor supply parameters, we numerically solve the household’s utility
maximization problem with given prices and observe the change in labor supply resulting from a change22
(1996). Together, these two elasticity targets yield the values for the elasticity of
substitution between leisure and capital and the benchmark ratio of total (labor plus
leisure) time to labor time. These values imply a marginal excess burden of 0.24 for
labor taxes. As in the analytical model, capital supply elasticities are set equal to labor
supply elasticities. With the same factor tax rate on both capital and labor income,
the marginal excess burden for capital taxes is thus the same as that for labor taxes.
3.4 Policy Experiments and Results
We employ the model to explore how much compensation is required to achieve equity
value neutrality (EVN) and the eﬃciency costs of providing such compensation. Under
the assumptions of the numerical model (including, in particular, the absence of uncer-
tainty), for any policy involving pollution permits there is an equivalent policy involving
a pollution tax. For example, a policy involving 100 percent auctioning of pollution
permits is equivalent to a pollution tax without any inframarginal exemption and whose
tax rate equals the permit price. Similarly, a policy involving partial free allocation of
permits can be made equivalent to a pollution tax with a partial inframarginal exemp-
tion and with a tax rate equal to the permit price. In the following, we describe all the
policy experiments as permits policies, although the results apply also to tax policies
generating the same emissions-reductions.
3.4.1 Results under Central Values for Parameters
We conduct ﬁve policy experiments; these are summarized in Table 3. Under each of
the ﬁve policies, we vary the stringency of the environmental regulation so that the cuts
in SO2 emissions range from 0 to 75 percent of initial, unregulated emissions.
Policies 1 and 2 involve 100 percent auctioning of pollution permits to industry Y .
These two policies diﬀer in the ways that the net revenues from the policy are returned
to the private sector to preserve the government’s budget balance. Under Policy 1, the
net revenues are returned as lump-sum transfers to households. Under Policy 2, they
are recycled through cuts in the marginal rates of labor and capital taxes. The rate
cuts are the same for labor and capital and apply to all uses of these factors.24
in the after-tax wage. We solve this as a constrained optimization problem, where the amount of capital
supplied is ﬁxed. To calculate the compensated elasticity, we also alter the household’s income so that
utility remains unchanged despite the the change in the after-tax wage.
24Recycling through marginal rate cuts implies smaller eﬃciency losses, so long as the tax that is cut
has a positive excess burden. This eﬃciency beneﬁt has been termed the “weak double dividend” from23
Policies 3-5 are like Policy 2 in attaining government budget balance through ad-
justments in the marginal rates of factor taxes. However, in contrast to Policy 2, these
policies impose the EVN requirement in at least one of the pollution-related industries.
EVN is achieved through the free allocation of a share of the permits to the industry in
question. The permits are grandfathered on the basis of the capital stock in the industry
before the environmental policy is announced and implemented. Only the owners of
existing capital are compensated: capital that moves into the industry afterwards does
not beneﬁt from grandfathering. Policy 3 involves free allocation of enough permits to
bring about EVN in the downstream industry. Policy 4 attains EVN in the upstream
industry. Policy 5 achieves EVN in both pollution-related industries.
Free permit allocation implies a sacriﬁce of potential revenue. Thus, for any given
pollution reduction, the reduction in factor tax rates will generally be less extensive
under policies 3-5 than under Policy 2. As indicated by the analytical model, this is a
main source of the cost of achieving EVN.
Policies 1 and 2: Table 4 displays the equilibrium outcomes under each of the poli-
cies. First consider policies 1 and 2. Permit prices and potential permit revenues
rise with the extent of the required pollution reduction. Thus, for the pollution cuts
we are considering here, the Laﬀer curve for permit revenues is still rising. The need
to purchase permits and to abate pollution increases production costs in industry Y ,
leading to higher output prices and lower equilibrium output. This is accompanied by
a reduced use of factors in this industry and lower rental rates on capital. Even though
capital is imperfectly mobile and sector-speciﬁc rental rates fall substantially, sector Y
reduces demand for capital more than demand for labor. The reason is that capital is
complementary to the polluting intermediate input X. Hence labor rather than capital
substitutes for the more expensive intermediate input X.
Reduced output and input substitution in industry Y curtails demand for the output
X of the upstream industry, which in turn causes prices, proﬁts, and factor use to fall
in that industry as well. In this sector, labor use declines more than capital demand
because, in contrast to capital, labor is perfectly mobile intersectorally.
Higher prices for the output of the downstream industry cause a shift in demand
toward industry C, the other ﬁnal good industry. The impacts on industry C are
relatively small, however. The use of capital in this industry rises because proﬁtr a t e si n
recycling environmental tax revenues in this way. See Goulder (1995).24
this industry are much less signiﬁcantly reduced than in the pollution-related industries.
Figure 2 shows the eﬃciency impact of these two policies. This impact is measured by the
equivalent variation, which is expressed as a percentage of benchmark income (see also
the bottom rows of Table 4). Eﬃciency costs rise more than in proportion to the extent
of pollution reduction. Table 4 reveals that if pollution cuts are modest (e.g., 10 percent,
the eﬃciency costs of Policy 2 are less than half that of Policy 1. However, the ratio of
Policy 2 to Policy 1’s eﬃciency costs rises with additional pollution abatement. Indeed,
with large pollution cuts, the regulated industry’s abatement costs become large and
diﬀerences in revenue-recycling methods become relatively less important to the overall
eﬃciency costs.25
Policy’s 2 relative advantage in terms of eﬃciency manifests itself primarily in in-
dustry C. Much of the household’s higher (relative to policy 1) real income is devoted
to increased purchases of output from this industry. Moreover, this sector beneﬁts from
the boost in aggregate factor supply produced by lower factor tax rates (compared to
Policy 1).
Policies 3-5: These policies diﬀer from Policy 2 in that they involve the free allocation
of enough pollution permits to achieve EVN. Figure 3 shows the additional eﬃciency
cost implied by the EVN requirement (under policies 3-5), as a percentage of the eﬃ-
ciency cost under Policy 2. These additional costs are closely related to the variable
χ, introduced in Section 2. The only diﬀerence is that Figure 3 provides the addi-
tional costs of EVN of the entire amount of abatement (compared to no abatement at
all), while χ represents the additional costs under EVN for a marginal increment to
abatement (measured compared to the marginal eﬃciency costs under policy 2).
Under all policies, the relative increase in eﬃciency cost declines with the extent
of abatement. If the required abatement is below 5 percent, achieving EVN for the
downstream industry (Policy 3) raises costs by over 100 percent, and achieving EVN for
25The potential revenues from emissions permits are the product of the number of permits issued (or
allowable pollution) and the permit price. More extensive abatement obviously implies fewer permits
issued. In our simulations, the increase in permit prices oﬀsets the reduction in the number of permits
and allows potential revenues to rise, but this increase is only modest compared to the rise in abatement
costs. Thus, as abatement becomes extensive it makes relatively little diﬀerence whether permit revenue
is recycled in a lump-sum fashion or by way of cuts in marginal tax rates. Similar results were obtained
in Goulder et al. (1997). This study showed that the diﬀerence between recycling revenues lump-sum
and recycling them through marginal tax cuts vanishes as pollution abatement approaches 100 percent.25
the upstream industry (Policy 4) raises costs by about 75 percent. In contrast, when
required emissions reductions exceed 50 percent, the relative increase in cost under the
two policies is below 18 and 12 percent, respectively. The costs under Policy 5 are very
close to the sum of the costs under policies 3 and 4, so that the relationship between the
relative cost increase and the stringency of the environmental policy follows a similar
pattern.
These results square with the ﬁndings of the analytical model. Let “ordinary eﬃ-
ciency costs” refer to the eﬃciency costs under Policy 2, that is, in the absence of an EVN
constraint. The analytical model indicated that, starting from an equilibrium without
abatement, the ﬁrst incremental amount of abatement implies no ﬁrst-order ordinary
eﬃciency costs. In contrast, achieving EVN involves ﬁrst-order eﬃciency costs, even at
the ﬁrst increment of abatement. Thus the additional eﬃciency cost of preventing ad-
verse redistributional eﬀects under policies 3, 4 and 5 (relative to the marginal eﬃciency
costs under Policy 2) is inﬁnite for the ﬁrst increment to abatement. This ratio then falls
with abatement, since the redistributional eﬀects (and thus the required compensation
for the aﬀected industries) grow more slowly than the economy-wide eﬃciency costs.
Indeed, at higher amounts of abatement, the economy-wide costs become increasingly
important relative to the costs that the environmental policies impose on the regulated
industries.
Figures 4a and 4b display respectively the average and marginal compensation ratios
for the downstream industry under Policy 3. The average compensation ratios are total
required compensation divided by total revenue collected. Thus they apply to “large”
amounts of abatement (compared to a situation without any abatement) and diﬀer from
the marginal compensation ratios applying to incremental increases in abatement, which
were computed in Section 2. In each ﬁgure, the compensation ratios are calculated on
a gross and net basis. As discussed in Section 2, the diﬀerence between the gross and
net ratios is that the net ratio includes the impact on the factor tax base and computes
compensation net of the factor tax revenue collected on that compensation.
The ﬁgures conform to the analytical results in showing that net compensation ratios
exceed the gross compensation ratios. This is the case for both average and marginal
compensation ratios. They also support the analytical results in revealing that the
compensation ratios rise with the extent of abatement, and that the marginal and av-
erage net compensation ratios can exceed 100 percent. In particular, under Policy 3
the average net compensation ratio rises above 100 percent once required abatement ex-
ceeds about 73 percent. At abatement levels beyond this level, the gross revenue from26
auctioning (some of) the permits is less than the policy-induced loss of revenue from
existing taxes stemming from the erosion of the factor tax base. At these abatement
levels, the government loses net revenue from imposing EVN. Despite the auctioning of
some of the permits26, preserving the government’s budget balance requires an increase
in factor tax rates.
These results oﬀer some perspectives on current policy initiatives. The Bush Ad-
ministration’s Clear Skies Initiative, in particular, would introduce tradable pollution
permits to control emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) ,m e r c u r y ,a n dn i t r o g e no x i d e sf r o m
electric power plants in the U.S. The Initiative would require SO2 reductions of 70
percent from the existing emissions cap (and by a larger percentage relative to the emis-
sions levels that would apply in the absence of any controls). Eﬀectively, 80 percent of
the SO2 permits would be freely allocated to the utilities.27 Results from our numerical
model, in Figure 4a, suggest that a smaller percentage – about 50 percent – of the
permits would need to be freely allocated to compensate the industry. This implication
should be interpreted with caution: a more detailed model would be needed to calcu-
late the compensation ratio with greater precision. Particularly signiﬁcant is the fact
that our model abstracts from heterogeneity among ﬁrms within each industry. The
presence of intra-industry heterogeneity might or might not imply higher compensation
ratios, depending on how equity value neutrality is deﬁned and whether the government
can observe heterogeneity and ﬁnely target compensation.28
26That some of the permits are auctioned is indicated by the fact that the gross compensation ratio
is positive.
27More precisely, the Initiative would freely allocate 99 percent of the permits initially, reduce this
percentage by 1 percentage point each year for 20 years, and then reduce it by 2.5 percent each year for
32 years, at which point all permits would be auctioned. Approximately 80 percent of the discounted
potential revenues over this 52-year interval would be foregone through the free allocation of permits.
28The compensation ratios calculated in the numerical model are consistent with those in a hetero-
geneous setting if the government deﬁnes EVN as the requirement that average losses in the targeted
industry must be zero. They would also be consistent with the situation where the government had
suﬃcient ﬂexibility to achieve EVN for each ﬁrm individually, tailoring compensation to the speciﬁc
features of individual ﬁrms, and removing any proﬁt-increases from ﬁrms that would otherwise expe-
rience such increases from the policy. In contrast, if the government insisted that no ﬁrm suﬀer a
loss, but lacked suﬃcient instruments to compensate each and every ﬁrm exactly, some ﬁrms would be
overcompensated. In this case, the average compensation ratio for the industry would be higher than
that predicted by the numerical model.
The signiﬁcance of heterogeneity to compensation ratios has been explored in detail by Burtraw et al.
(2002). That study, which does not focus on the eﬃciency cost of compensation, calculates compensation
ratios for CO2 emissions permits programs applied to the electric utilities industry, taking account of27
Figures 5a and 5b provide for Policy 4 (involving compensation to the upstream
industry) the same sorts of information as that provided by ﬁgures 4a and 4b for Policy
3. The ratios for the upstream industry (under Policy 4) follow a similar pattern to those
for the downstream industry (under Policy 3). However, the ratios in that industry are
somewhat lower (for given levels of abatement). This is because elasticities of supply are
higher for industry X than for industry Y .29
These experiments bring out several key ﬁndings. First, they clarify how the eﬃ-
ciency costs of EVN change with the amount of abatement. In absolute terms, the cost
implied by introducing the EVN constraint rises with the extent of abatement. At the
same time, relative to the cost in the absence of the EVN constraint, the cost from the
EVN constraint falls as abatement becomes more extensive.
Second, the experiments reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between gross and net compen-
sation ratios, especially at high abatement levels. These diﬀerences reﬂect the erosion
of the tax base resulting from the environmental policy’s impact on factor incomes.
The erosion of the factor tax base — a phenomenon emphasized in recent numerical
experiments by Smith, Ross, and Montgomery (2002) — becomes quite large when en-
vironmental policy is fairly stringent. Wi t hg r e a t e re r o s i o no ft h et a xb a s e ,t h enet
revenue collected from environmental taxes or auctioning of emissions permits is lower,
so that the cuts in pre-existing taxes ﬁnanced by the environmental policy must be more
modest. Indeed, in our central-case experiments the net compensation ratio under Pol-
icy 3 exceeds 100 percent when abatement approaches 75 percent. At these levels of
abatement, environmental policy collects no net revenue if the harmed industries must
be compensated; to preserve budget-balance, the government must raise existing factor
taxes. Tax-base erosion adds to the cost of revenue-neutral environmental reforms by
limiting the government’s potential to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes.
Finally, we ﬁnd that even though the policies we consider target SO2 emissions from
the downstream (electric utilities) industry, owners of capital in the upstream (fossil fuel)
the heterogeneity among electric power generators.
29We have performed separate experiments applicable to CO2 policy, similar to those in Bovenberg
and Goulder (2001). These experiments calculate the compensation ratio applicable to upstream (fossil
fuel supplying) industries under a policy involving a 22 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. In the
present model, the compensation ratio is 16.2 percent. This compares with a ratio of 11 percent in
Bovenberg and Goulder (2001). It is diﬃcult to pinpoint the sources of diﬀerences in the results, since
the models diﬀer in several ways. However, one potential factor is that the present model assumes
somewhat higher demand elasticities than in the earlier study. This could partly account for the higher
compensation ratios.28
industry bear a signiﬁcant share of the overall burden to capital owners. As indicated in
Figure 3, the added eﬃciency cost of achieving EVN under Policy 4 is about two thirds
the added cost under Policy 3. This extra cost is proportional to the compensation
required or revenue-sacriﬁce involved. Hence the burden to owners of upstream industry
capital is approximately two thirds the size of the burden to owners of capital in the
downstream industry.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We now consider the sensitivity of results to alternative values for key parameters.
End-of-pipe treatment. One distinguishing feature of the present study is its consid-
eration of end-of-pipe treatment as one of the channels through which ﬁrms can reduce
their pollution emissions. The ease of such treatment is governed by the parameter βe,
whose central case value is 2. The low case employs a value of .01 (implying virtually
no possibility of end-of-pipe treatment) and the high case a value of 4.
Figure 6a shows, for Policy 3, the gross and net (average) compensation ratios, for
low and high values of βe. The impact on the compensation ratios is minor. This squares
with the analytical model, which showed easier abatement impacts the compensation
ratios through two oﬀsetting eﬀects. On the one hand, easier abatement reduces the
potential revenues from emission cuts as lower emission tax rates are required. On the
other hand, with easier abatement, lower implicit tax rates are required, thereby reducing
the erosion of the tax base and raising potential revenues. These diverging impacts on
potential revenues exert oﬀsetting eﬀects on the compensation ratios. The ease of end-
of-pipe treatment also has relatively little eﬀect on the added cost of Policy 3’s EVN
constraint, relative to the cost under Policy 2. This is shown in Figure 6b. Consistent
with the analytical results, at low levels of abatement, easier abatement reduces the
compensation ratio as the burden on the aﬀected industry is smaller and thus less
compensation is required. At higher levels of abatement, easier abatement substantially
reduces the economy-wide costs of emission reductions in terms of an erosion of the
environmental tax base and this impact on the denominator of χ dominates the impact
on the numerator (i.e., the eﬃciency costs of the required compensation).
Although the ease of end-of-pipe treatment exerts only little impact on Policy 3’s
compensation ratios or its relative increment to eﬃciency costs (compared with Policy
2), it substantially aﬀects the absolute cost of achieving emissions reductions. This is
revealed by Table 5, which contains the implications of alternative values of βe and other29
parameters for the costs of achieving emissions reductions under Policy 2. The numbers
in the table are the ratio of eﬃciency costs under alternative parameters to eﬃciency
costs in the central case. More possibilities for end-of-pipe treatment signiﬁcantly reduce
the costs of emission cuts.
Input substitution. Figures 7a and 7b show for Policy 3 the implications of alter-
native values for σy, the elasticity of substitution between L and v (a composite of X
and K) in the production of Y. The central case value for σy is 0.75. Here we halve




d), Figure 7a shows that a higher value of σy raises the compen-
sation ratios. A larger σy implies that a larger share if the emission cut comes from
substitution away from X and K, as opposed to end-of-pipe treatment. This implies a
greater reduction in the demand for capital and a larger reduction in proﬁts in industry
Y . Also in the upstream sector, demand for capital declines as a result of lower demand
for X. Thus the required compensation is higher.
Figures 8a and 8b provide results for diﬀerent values of σv, the elasticity of substitu-
tion between K and X in the production of the composite input v in the Y industry.
The implications of a higher σv for the capital owners in the downstream sector are dif-
ferent from a higher σy. A higher elasticity σv beneﬁts capitalists in sector Y because it
is easier to substitute capital for the dirty input, which protects after-tax proﬁts in that
sector. In contrast, owners of upstream-industry capital suﬀer from a higher elasticity
as the demand for X declines more substantially. Just as in the previous case, higher
substitution elasticities mitigate the eﬃciency costs of abatement (see Table 5).
Substitution in Household Utility. Figures 9a and 9b consider diﬀerent values for
σg, the elasticity of substitution between C and Y in the G subutility function. Here
we halve and double this elasticity, whose central case value is 0.9. When this elasticity
is high, the demand for Y is more elastic. As indicated in Section 2, this means that
capital will bear a larger share of the burden of the pollution regulation. Hence the
compensation ratio is higher. This elasticity is a signiﬁcant issue in the context of the
tradable emissions permits system which is now being planned for the European Union.
European manufacturers of carbon-intensive products argue that the permits system will
cause them to lose considerable share of the market to foreign (that is, non-European)
ﬁrms. Thus they fear that the elasticity of demand for their goods is fairly high. These
results suggest that a highly elastic demand would imply a high compensation ratio.
Ah i g h e rσg raises the added cost of compensation under Policy 3 relative to Policy 2
(Figure 9b) through two channels: raising the required compensation and lowering the30
economy-wide eﬃciency costs of pollution abatement (see also Table 5).
Figures 10a and 10b compare diﬀerent values for σu, the elasticity between the G
and H composites in utility. This elasticity determines the elasticity of factor supplies
and thus the erosion of the factor tax base. As discussed in Section 2, the greater the
erosion of the factor tax base, the wider the gap between the gross and net compensation
ratios. Thus, in Figure 10a, a higher σu raises the gap between the gross and net ratios.
The analytical model revealed that higher labor supply elasticities raise the additional
eﬃciency losses of EVN, χ. Figure 10b conﬁrms this result. At the same time, a higher
σu implies greater ﬂexibility in the economy, so the overall eﬃciency costs of achieving
given levels of abatement under Policy 2 are smaller (Table 5).
Figures 11a and 11b relate the gross compensation ratios and eﬃciency costs to
σk, which controls the ease of capital adjustment across industries. The central case
value for σk is -1. We consider alternative values of -0.5 and -2.0, respectively, for σk.
When σk is low in absolute value, capital is relatively inelastic and thus bears a larger
share of the burden of the environmental regulation. Hence the required compensation
is larger. By increasing the required compensation, a low value of σk also raises the
relative eﬃciency costs of Policy 3 (Figure 11b).
4 Conclusions
A politically realistic approach to environmental policy requires consideration of distri-
butional impacts. It seems important to consider, in particular, how to mitigate or
avoid potentially adverse impacts on groups with eﬀective veto power. Representatives
of pollution-related industries seem to be one such group. In this paper we have con-
sidered the eﬃciency costs of achieving equity value (that is, preventing proﬁt-losses) in
pollution-related industries.
Losses of proﬁt can be avoided through the free allocation of emissions permits or,
equivalently, the exemption of inframarginal emissions from a pollution tax. However,
such policies increase eﬃciency costs because they compel the government to forego
potential pollution-tax or pollution-permit revenue and rely more heavily on ordinary
distortionary taxes. Our paper employs analytically and numerically solved models to
examine the eﬃciency costs implied by these compensation measures.
The added eﬃciency cost is related to the compensation ratio: the share of potential
pollution-permit or pollution-tax revenue that the government must forego to protect
the industries in question. We explore what determines the magnitude of this ratio in31
both upstream and downstream industries, and how these ratios are related to eﬃciency
costs.
The analytical model shows that, in the upstream industry, the gross compensation
ratio increases to the extent that proﬁts account for a large share of the industry’s
output, capital supply is inelastic (mobility is limited), or demand for output is rather
elastic. For the downstream industry, this ratio rises to the extent that capital is more
immobile than in the upstream industry and output demand is highly elastic. In both
industries, the ratio rises with the stringency of environmental policy (the extent of
required abatement). These results are reinforced by numerical simulations. The gross
compensation ratio corresponds to the share of emissions permits that must be freely
allocated to prevent a loss of proﬁt. Our numerical simulations suggest that the Bush
Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative would overcompensate electric utilities by freely
allocating more than the share required to preserve their proﬁts.
The two models also indicate that, in absolute terms, the added cost implied by
introducing the EVN constraint rises with the extent of abatement. At the same
time, relative to the cost in the absence of the EVN constraint, the added cost from
the EVN constraint falls as environmental policy becomes more stringent. With more
abatement, the cost of neutralizing adverse proﬁt-impacts shrinks relative to the other
eﬃciency costs related to the policy intervention.
The simulations reveal the signiﬁcance of erosion of the factor tax base, especially
at high abatement levels. As the amount of abatement becomes large, the erosion of the
tax base can imply high net compensation ratios. Indeed, in our central-case experi-
ments the net compensation ratio under Policy 3 exceeds 100 percent when abatement
approaches 75 percent. At these levels of abatement, this environmental policy collects
no net revenue; to preserve budget-balance, the government needs to raise existing factor
taxes.
Some caveats are in order. First, while preventing proﬁt losses might well increase the
prospects for political acceptability of various policies, it does not guarantee it. The
political process is complex, and depends on more than this particular distributional
issue. A second and closely related issue is that we have concentrated entirely on
compensation to a single immobile factor, which in the numerical model is calibrated
to be existing capital. One might wish to consider the costs of compensating other
important stakeholders. Oﬀering compensation to workers for temporary or long-term
unemployment seems especially worthy of consideration.30 Third, our models are fairly
30If the policy involves gross costs in the aggregate, then (ignoring the environmental beneﬁts) clearly32
simple. They have the attraction of transparency and ﬂexibility, but more detailed
models could yield more precise quantitativer e s u l t s . F i n a l l y ,w eh a v en o tc o n s i d e r e d
the full range of potential environmental policies or compensation mechanisms. In
future work we plan to examine the costs of compensation under other policies, such
as technology mandates and performance standards. In addition, we would like to
explore other compensation instruments, such as sector speciﬁc cuts in capital or labor
taxes. Some of these alternative instruments might well be more eﬃcient mechanisms
for spreading more evenly the burden of environmental policy initiatives.
it is not possible to compensate every aﬀected party. Overcoming political obstacles may nevertheless
be possible, so long as the especially inﬂuential stakeholders are compensated or otherwise brought on
board. Our paper is motivated by the viewpoint that certain energy-related industries have had and
will continue to have a particularly signiﬁcant impact on environmental policy outcomes in the U.S.33
References
Anderson, Soren, and Richard Newell, 2003. “Prospects for Carbon Capture and Stor-
age Technologies.” Discussion Paper 02-68, Resources for the Future, Washington,
DC.
Barreto, Daniel, Derek J. Gurney, Xiaoying Xie, and Lawrence H. Goulder, 2002.
“An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model for Analyzing U.S. Energy and Environ-
mental Policies: Data Documentation.” Working paper, Stanford University.
Banzhaf, Spencer, Dallas Burtraw, and Karen Palmer, 2002. “Eﬃcient Emission
Fees in the U.S. Electricity Sector.” Discussion Paper 02-45, Resources for the Future,
Washington, DC, October.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Ruud A. de Mooij, 1994. “Environmental Levies and
Distortionary Taxation.” American Economic Review 84(4), 1085-9.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder, 2001. “Neutralizing the Adverse
Industry Impacts of CO2 Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?” In C. Carraro
and G. Metcalf, eds., Behavioral and Distributional Eﬀects of Environmental Policy,
University of Chicago Press.
Bovenberg, A. Lans, and Lawrence H. Goulder, 2002. “Environmental Taxation and
Regulation in a Second-Best Setting,” In A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook
of Public Economics, second edition, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Burtraw, Dallas, Karen Palmer, Ranjit Bharvirkar, and Anthony Paul, 2002. “The
Eﬀect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances.” Dis-
cussion Paper 02-15, Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C., March.
Chirinko, Robert S., Steven M. Fazzari, and Andrew P. Meyer, 2002. “That Elusive
Elasticity: A Long-Panel Approach to Estimating the Price Sensitivity of Business
Capital.” Working paper, Emory University, January.
Dinan, Terry M., 2003. “Shifting the Cost Burden of a Carbon Cap-and-Trade
Program.” U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃce, Washington, D.C., July.
Farrow, Scott, 1999. “The Duality of Taxes and Tradeable Permits: A Survey
with Applications in Central and Eastern Europe.” Environmental and Development
Economics 4:519-535.
Freeman, A. Myrick, 1993. The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Val-
ues: Theory and Methods. Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C.
Fullerton, Don, and Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2001. “Environmental Controls, Scarcity
Rents, and Pre-Existing Distortions.” Journal of Public Economics 80(2):249-67.34
Goulder, Lawrence H., 1995. “Environmental Taxation and the ‘Double Dividend:’
A Reader’s Guide,” International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157-183.
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W. H. Parry, and Dallas Burtraw, 1997. “Revenue-
Raising vs. Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Signiﬁcance
of Pre-Existing Tax Distortions.” RAND Journal of Economics 28(4):708_731.
Goulder, Lawrence H., Ian W. H. Parry, Roberton C. Williams III, and Dallas Bur-
traw, 1999. “The Cost-Eﬀectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental
Protection in a Second-Best Setting,” Journal of Public Economics 72(3):329-60.
Olson, Mancur, 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Parry, Ian W. H., 1995. ”Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling,” Journal of En-
vironmental Economics and Management 29, S64-S77.
Russek, Frank S., 1996. “Labor Supply and Taxes.” Working paper, Macroeconomic
Analysis Division, Congressional Budget Oﬃce, Washington, D.C.
Smith, Anne E., Martin E. Ross, and W. David Montgomery, 2002. “Implications
of Trading Implementation Design for Equity-Eﬃciency Trade-oﬀsi nC a r b o nP e r m i t
Allocations,” Working paper, Charles River Associates, Washington, D.C., December.35
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 The market for the ﬁnal good
A.1.1 Supply































The right-hand side of (A.1) indicates that the cost of the intermediate input consists of two
parts: the production costs of this input, Px, and the emission tax levied on the additional
emissions generated by the intermediate input.
Loglinearizing the production function of the downstream industry (4) and employing the
ﬁrst-order conditions (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4) (and using the fact that the emission function
(5) exhibits constant returns to scale), we ﬁnd
y = ky +( 1− α
y
k)(ly − ky)+( 1− αy
v)(x − v), (A.5)
where α
y
k ≡ RyKy/(RyKy+PxX+TeE+PcCa+PyYa) and αy
v ≡ (RyKy+PxX+TeE+PcCa+
PyYa)/PyY =1− (WLy/PyY ).
With constant-returns-to-scale production and emission functions, the relative change in








x ≡ PxX/PyY and αy
e ≡ TeE/PyY stand for the cost shares of, respectively, the direct
production costs of the intermediate good and the emission tax.
31 Note that wages and Pc do not change. This implies that the costs of abatement do not
change because we assume, in line with our assumption that the upstream and downstream
industries are small compared to the rest of the economy, that the share of abatement produced
by the downstream industry (i.e. Ya) in aggregate abatement g(Ca;Ya) is only inﬁnitely small.36






K stands for the substitution elasticity between the industry-speciﬁc capital services in
the ﬁnal goods sector and the capital services in the rest of the economy. Using (A.4), (A.2), and
(A.1) to eliminate Py and log-linearizing the results, we arrive at the following two equations
















where σV stands for the substitution elasticity between the intermediate input and capital in
the composite v(.;.) while σY represents the substitution elasticity between labor and the nest
v(.;.) in the production function h(.;.) (see (4)). Substituting (A.7), (A.6), (A.8), and (A.9) into
(A.5), we write the supply of the ﬁnal good in terms of its price, the price of the intermediate













k] is the supply elasticity. This supply elasticity becomes inﬁnite
if capital (i.e. the ’ﬁxed’ factor) does not play a role in production (i.e. α
y
k =0or αy
v =0 ) ,
if industry-speciﬁc capital is a perfect substitute for capital in the rest of the economy (i.e.
σ
y
K ⇒∞so that adjustment costs are absent), or if intermediate inputs are a perfect substitute
for the imperfectly mobile factor (i.e. capital) (i.e. σv ⇒∞ ). In all these cases, the immobile
factor does not constrain production of the ﬁnal good.
In a similar way, we can derive the impact on the demand for the intermediate good (using
























skip Linearizing the emission function (5) and the ﬁrst-order condition for abatement (A.3),
32 This assumes that all households are well diversiﬁed so that income eﬀects can be ignored.
Alternatively, one can assume that a share γy of capital owners in the downtream industry is
completely specialized in this sector (i.e. only derives income from capital in this sector). In
that case the elasticity σ
y
k in the following equation is replaced by (1 − γy)σ
y
k + γyεu,w h e r eεu
stands for the uncompensated elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the rate of
return.37
we ﬁnd emissions in terms of the emission tax and the prices of the ﬁnal and intermediate goods33




















































where σe represents the substitution elasticity between the intermediate input X and abate-
ment g(Ca;Ya) in the emission function e(, ) (see (5)). The second term at the ﬁrst right-hand
side of (A.12) shows that the pollution tax reduces emissions per unit of intermediate input.















PcCa+PyYa+TeE, is large) and if substitution between abatement and inter-
mediate input is easy (i.e. σe is large).
A.1.2 Demand










Log-linearization of this equation yields the demand function
y = −σgpy, (A.14)
where σg represents the substitution elasticity between the ﬁnal good Y and other consumption
goods C in the household sub-utility function g(.,.) (see (8)).
A.1.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium on the market for the ﬁnal good implies that demand (i.e. the right-hand side of
(A.14) equals the right-hand side of (A.10)). This yields the price of the ﬁn a lg o o di nt e r m so f
















v. The ﬁnal goods sector can shift the entire burden of higher
costs (due to either a higher emission tax or a higher price of the intermediate input) forward
to consumers if it can as easily substitute away from the intermediate good as the consumers
33 Without an initial emission tax, the ﬁrm does not abate in the initial equilibrium (i.e.





e =0 . Hence, the relative change in emissions remains
ﬁnite even though te goes to inﬁnity if the initial emission tax is zero.38
can substitute away from the dirty ﬁnal good (i.e. σy = σv = σg). However, if consumers
have more opportunities to substitute away from the ﬁnal good than ﬁnal good producers have
to substitute away from the intermediate input (i.e. σg > σy = σv so that ε
y
d > 0),t h eﬁnal
good industry has to absorb some of the burden of the higher costs of intermediate inputs and
emissions. This share becomes larger if a smaller elasticity σ
y








The impact on the output of the ﬁnal goods industry is found by substituting (A.15) into












Higher costs of the intermediate input substantially depress the output of the ﬁnal good if both
the demand elasticity σG and the supply elasticity εy
s are large.
A.1.4 Distribution


















where the ﬁrst equality follows from (A.6) and the second equality by substitution of (A.15) to
eliminate py. Rentals in the ﬁnal goods sector thus decline with higher costs of the intermediate
input and emissions if the substitution possibilities of consumers exceed those of producers (i.e.,
σg > σy = σv so that εx
d > 0 ). Rentals increase, however, if capital is a good substitute
for the polluting intermediate good (i.e. σv is large) while consumers can not easily substitute
away from the ﬁnal good (i.e. σg is small) and producers cannot easily substitute labor for the
composite v(Ky;X) (i.e. σy is small) so that ε
y
d ≡ σg +[ ( 1− αy
v) σy− σv]/αy
v < 0. In this case,
the demand for capital rises on account of a positive substitution eﬀect as producers substitute
capital (rather than labor) for the polluting input. At the same time, production of the ﬁnal
good does not decline much as households do not respond much to the higher price of the ﬁnal
good. With a substantial positive substitution eﬀect on capital demand thus dominating a small
(in absolute value) scale eﬀect on capital demand, the demand for capital rises thereby boosting
the rental rate.
34 Producers optimally set the capital stock according to (A.4). Accordingly, the envelope
theorem implies that a change in the capital stock does not directly aﬀect the producer surplus.39
A.2 The market for the intermediate good
A.2.1 Demand
Demand for the intermediate good can be written in terms of the price of intermediate goods





































is the price elasticity of the demand for the interme-
diate good. A higher price of the intermediate good depresses the demand for the intermediate
good through two channels: a negative ’scale’ eﬀect on the output of the ﬁnal goods sector
(i.e. the ﬁrst term in the square brackets at the right-hand side of the deﬁnition of the demand
elasticity)) and a negative substitution eﬀect (i.e. the second term in the square brackets at the
right-hand side of the deﬁnition of the demand elasticity)).
A.2.2 Supply
Loglinearizing the production function of the upstream industry (1), we ﬁnd
xs = kx +( 1− αx
k)(lx − kx), (A.19)
where αx
k ≡ RxKx/PxX stands for the share of capital in output of the upstream sector. With
a constant-returns-to-scale production function, the relative change in the output price is a
weighted average of the relative changes in the input prices (note that wages do not change)
px = αx
krx. (A.20)




k stands for the substitution elasticity between the industry-speciﬁc capital services in
the intermediate goods industry and the capital services in the rest of the economy.
Using (2) and (3) to eliminate Px and log-linearizing the results, we arrive at
lx − kx = σxrx, (A.22)
35 This assumes that all households are well diversiﬁed so that income eﬀects can be ignored.
Alternatively, one can assume that a share γx of capital owners in the upstream industry is
completely specialized in this sector (i.e. only derives income from capital in this sector). In
that case the elasticity σx
k in the following equation is replaced by (1 − γx)σx
k + γxεu,w h e r eεu
stands for the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the rate of return.40
where σx stands for the substitution elasticity between the two inputs in the production of the
intermediate good.
Substituting (A.21), (A.22), and (A.20) into (A.19) to eliminate kx, (lx − kx), and rx, we






k +( 1− αx
k)σx]/αx
k denotes the supply elasticity. This elasticity becomes inﬁnite
if capital (i.e. the ’ﬁxed’ factor) does not play a role in production (i.e. αx
k =0 ) , if capital is
a perfect substitute for capital in the rest of the economy (i.e. σx
k ⇒∞so that adjustment
costs are absent), or if mobile labor is a perfect substitute for the imperfectly mobile factor (i.e.
capital) (i.e. σx ⇒∞ ). In all these cases, the immobile factor does not constrain production of
the ﬁnal good.
A.2.3 Equilibrium
The demand for the intermediate good is given by (A.18). The supply is given by (A.23).




























Demand bears most of the emission tax burden (i.e. the demand price rises substantially (as
indicated by the sign of αy
xpx+αy
ete) while the supply price Px does not decline much) if demand
is inelastic compared to supply (i.e. if εx
d is small compared to εx
s).




































Output of the intermediate good falls substantially on account of the emission tax if both the
demand and supply elasticities are large. This is the case if capital is mobile and demand for the
ﬁnal good is elastic. Moreover, input substitution between capital and the dirty intermediate
input in the downstream industry increases the decline in output of the intermediate goods
industry.
A.2.4 Emission reductions
































Inverting this equation, we can write the tax rate in terms of the pollution reduction. In
this way, we can write the results in terms of the required reduction in pollution rather than
the tax rate. Hence, we can alternatively parameterize environmental policy by changes in the
pollution tax te or by changes in emission permits e. In particular, we can relate the required
cost increase (as a ratio of the initial price of the output of the downstream industry) αy
ete to
the required emission cut a = −e :
αy
ete = κa, (A.29)





























. The denominator in this deﬁnition of κ in-
cludes the various channels through which emission can be cut, namely (i) abatement (which is
the second term in the denominator), (ii) output of the ﬁnal good (which is implicit in the ﬁrst






























and thus aﬀects the ﬁrst term in the denominator of (A.29)), and (iii) input substitution between
capital and the intermediate input in the downstream industry (this is implicit in the second
term between square brackets in the deﬁnition of εx
d). The emission cost increase αy
ete required
to attain a certain emission cut (−e) falls as these three channels become more eﬀective.
A.3 Distributional impacts
We now analyze the distributional impacts of the environmental policy. The non-environmental
welfare impacts consist of the change in the after-tax producer surplus in the upstream industry
(PSX), the change in the after-tax producer surplus in the downstream industry (PSY), and
the change in non-environmental (after-tax) consumer surplus (NCS). It will be convenient
to express these three components of non-environmental welfare relative to PyY , the initial42





xpx + πx]=( 1− T)[αy
xα
y




=( 1− T)[py − αy
xpx − αy
ete + πy]=( 1− T)[αy
vα
y




= −(1 − T)[py +( t/β)], (A.32)
where πi denotes lump-sum compensation (which is assumed to be taxed at the factor tax T)
to sector i;i = x,y (expressed relative to PyY ) and t ≡ dT/(1 − T). β ≡ PyY/Q, where Q
is aggregate factor income (before tax). This share goes to zero in our model in which the
downstream and upstream sectors are very small compared to the rest of the economy.36
To arrive at the reduced-form equations, we substitute (A.24), (A.25), and (A.26) (and
using (A.29) to eliminate αy
ete) into the second right-hand sides of (A.30) and (A.31):


























κa + πy. (A.34)
Setting these equations equal to zero, we ﬁnd πx and πy required to ensure equity value neutrality
in both sectors. The ﬁrst terms at the right-hand sides of these expressions show which shares
of the emission cost increase is born by the upstream and downstream industries, respectively.
A.4 Eﬃciency costs
To ﬁnd ncs, we derive t/β from the government budget constraint. This latter constraint is
given by
g +( 1− T)π = αy
e(te(1 − T)+e)+Tq+( 1− T)(t/β), (A.35)
where q ≡ [αk +( 1− α)l]/β is the change in aggregate factor supply measured relative to the
initial output of the downstream industry (α is the share of capital income in aggregate value
added and k and l represent aggregrate capital and labor supply, respectively), g stands for
the change in government spending (expressed relative to the initial output of the downstream
industry Y )a n dπ ≡ πx + πy.T h e ﬁrst term (1 − T) at the right-hand side of this equation
follows from the no-proﬁt constraint, which implies that a higher pollution tax implies lower
factor income (and thus lower factor tax revenue since factor income is taxed at rate T).
36 A l s ot h er e l a t i v ec h a n g ei nt h ef a c t o rt a x ,t, goes to zero. However, the ratio t/β in (A.32)
is well deﬁned.43
Substituting (A.35) into (A.32) to eliminate t, we ﬁnd for the overall non-environmental
welfare eﬀect ψ ≡ psx+psy+ncs (using the ﬁrst equalities after the deﬁnitions in (A.30), (A.31),
and (A.32):
ψ = αy
ee + Tq− g, (A.36)
where we also ignore the welfare eﬀects of higher government spending (just as we ignore the
welfare eﬀects of better environmental quality as a result of less pollution).
Aggregate factor supply is
qβ = −εu[t + βαy
ete]+εI[πβ], (A.37)
where εI is the income elasticity of aggregate factor supply. Using (A.35) to eliminate t from




1 − εu[T/(1 − T)]
¶
[εu (αy
ee − g) − εcπ(1 − T)]. (A.38)
Substitution of (A.38) into (A.36) yields
ψ = λ(αy
ee − g) − µπ(1 − T), (A.39)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ed e ﬁnitions of λ and µ (see (9) and (10)).
We ﬁnd the eﬀect on the consumer surplus by using ncs = ψ − psx − psy and substituting



























The last term represents the redistributional eﬀects of an environmental tax recycled as lower
factor taxes. If the supply elasticities εx
s and εy
s are less than inﬁnite, the sector-speciﬁcf a c t o r s
pay part of the tax while factors outside the sectors beneﬁt from the recycling of this tax
burden.
A.5 Eﬃciency and equity value neutrality
We are now ready to combine the eﬃciency results with those for equity by exploring the
eﬃciency costs of equity value neutrality (EVN). If for both sectors EVN is imposed, we derive


















κa . Substituting this, g =0
and −e = a into (A.39), we arrive at
ψ/a = −λαy



















With sector-speciﬁc production factors shielded from any losses, the eﬃciency eﬀect corre-
sponds to the loss of consumer surplus (i.e. ncs = ψ).
Expression (A.41) shows the eﬃciency loss as a result of the environmental improvement
consists of two terms, namely, ﬁrst, a loss as a result of the erosion of the environmental tax
base and, second, an eﬃciency loss as a result of paying lump-sum compensation to the sector-
speciﬁc factors in the polluting industries. The ratio of the two terms, χ, can be interpreted
as the additional eﬃciency cost of achieving equity value neutrality in terms of the marginal

















































The government collects tax revenues. The change in potential tax revenues (again expressed





e((1 − T)te + e)+Tq, (A.43)
where q ≡ [αk +( 1− α)l]/β is the change in aggregate factor supply expressed relative to the
initial output of the downstream industry (α is the share of capital income in aggregate value
added).
Setting g =0and substituting (A.38) into (A.43), we arrive at
trn = αy
e[te(1 − T)+λe] − µπ(1 − T). (A.44)
The net compensation ratios are deﬁned as the share of net revenue that needs to be paid in
net compensation (1 − T)πi, i.e. sn
i ≡ (1 − T)πi/trn (i=x,y). By substituting a = −e, (A.33)
to ﬁnd πx and πy required to achieve equity value neutrality in the upstream and downstream
industries respectively, and (A.29) to eliminate αy
ete, we arrive at the net compensation ratios




































































We can also deﬁne gross tax revenues as follows trg ≡
d(TeE)
PyY = αy
e(te + e). We thus do
not take into account the impact on the base of the factor taxes. We can compute the gross
compensation ratios as the share of gross revenue that needs to be paid in gross compensation
πi, i.e. s
g


































We observe that net compensation ratios exceed the gross compensation ratios if initial
factor taxes are positive (i.e. T,µ > 0, see (10)) and the marginal cost of public funds exceeds
unity (i.e. λ > 1 because εu > 0, see (9)). To illustrate, if we start from an initial equilibrium
without any environmental policy (i.e. αy






























The (marginal) compensation ratios raise with the level of abatement as long as the pol-
icy yields net revenue (i.e. as long as we do not hit the top of the Laﬀer curve). 37 The
reason is that in this interval more abatement raises the share αy
e. Thus, whereas more initial
abatement (by raising αy
e) tends to reduce the additional eﬃciency costs ratio χ, it typically
reduces the compensation ratio. Indeed, we can relate the compensation ratios to the additional
























e. The tax-base erosion eﬀect αy
e increases the de-
nominator of the ratio χ but decreases tax revenues and therefore the denominator of the com-
pensation ratios. Thus, the eﬃciency ratio is large compared to the gross compensation ratio if
distortionary taxes and compensated wage elasticities of labor are large. At the same time, initial
abatement should be small so that marginal economy-wide eﬃciency costs are small while the
policy yields substantial additional revenues (κ > αy
e so that Laﬀer curve is upward sloping).
37 If the policy yields less revenue, the compensation ratios are not well deﬁned.Figure 1
















Benchmark Input-Output Flows for the Numerical Model
1 
Use of Input by Industry ...
XYC
  Total
  Receipts to





   X        0.0      27.1        0.0          27.1
   L        2.6      11.8  1765.3      1779.7       5249.8
   K      13.7      44.0    712.4        770.1       2271.5




     27.1    130.9  4129.5
SO2 Emissions
4      15.2
1 In billions of year-2000 dollars per year except where otherwise noted
2 Inputs of labor and capital are net of factor taxes.




in equation (32) of text.
4 Millions of tons per year
Sources:  Except for the emissions data, these flows are based on the Department of Commerce
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Benchmark Input & Output Tables for 1992.  The emissions data
are from Table 12.6 of the Energy Information Agency’s Annual Energy Review 1999.Table 2
Central Case Parameter Values
parameters for Y industry
β e ease of end-of pipe treatment -- scale parameter 2.0
ρ e ease of end-of-pipe treatment -- curvature parameter 0.6
σ y elasticity of substitution between
v and L in production of Y 0.75
σ v elasticity of substitution between 
X and K in production of v 0.15
parameters for X and C industries
σ x elasticity of substitution between
K and L in production of X 1.0
σ c elasticity of substitution between
v and L in production of C 1.0
other production-related parameters
σ k ease of capital movement            -1.0
γ ratio of potential to actual capital 1.77
utility function parameters
σ u elasticity of substitution between
G (C-Y composite) and H (L-K) composite 0.66
σ g elasticity of substitution between
C and Y 0.9
σ h elasticity of substitution between










1 lump-sum transfer to
households
none none
2 economy-wide cuts in
labor and capital tax rates
none none
3 economy-wide cuts in




4 economy-wide cuts in
labor and capital tax rates
none grandfathering of
pollution permits
5 economy-wide cuts in





Percent abatement 10 25 75 10 25 75 10 25 75 10 25 75 10 25 75
Policy Instruments
Permit price 0.10 0.26 3.85 0.10 0.26 3.86 0.10 0.26 3.85 0.10 0.26 3.85 0.10 0.26 3.85
Potential permit revenues 1.33 2.94 14.64 1.33 2.94 14.66 1.33 2.94 14.64 1.33 2.94 14.65 1.33 2.94 14.63
Compensation ratio Y, gross -- -- -- -- -- -- 28.05 31.03 46.31 -- -- -- 28.44 31.46 46.88
Compensation ratio Y, net -- -- -- -- -- -- 31.48 38.14 109.16 -- -- -- 33.59 41.08 129.14
Compensation ratio X, gross -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 17.98 19.49 25.10 18.17 19.70 25.42
Compensation ratio X, net -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 19.66 23.17 52.86 21.45 25.72 70.03
Industry X
% change in output price -0.90 -2.17 -13.89 -0.91 -2.17 -13.90 -0.91 -2.17 -13.89 -0.91 -2.17 -13.89 -0.91 -2.17 -13.89
% change in K rental price -1.07 -2.56 -16.21 -1.07 -2.56 -16.22 -1.07 -2.56 -16.21 -1.07 -2.56 -16.22 -1.07 -2.56 -16.21
% change in K stocks -1.03 -2.47 -15.63 -1.03 -2.46 -15.60 -1.03 -2.46 -15.63 -1.03 -2.46 -15.62 -1.03 -2.47 -15.66
% change in employment -2.09 -4.95 -29.21 -2.08 -4.94 -29.18 -2.08 -4.94 -29.21 -2.08 -4.94 -29.20 -2.08 -4.95 -29.22
% change in output -1.20 -2.87 -17.93 -1.19 -2.85 -17.89 -1.20 -2.86 -17.93 -1.19 -2.86 -17.91 -1.20 -2.86 -17.95
Industry Y
% change in output price 0.65 1.59 12.66 0.65 1.59 12.67 0.65 1.59 12.66 0.65 1.59 12.67 0.65 1.59 12.66
% change in K rental price -0.53 -1.28 -9.25 -0.53 -1.28 -9.25 -0.53 -1.28 -9.25 -0.53 -1.28 -9.25 -0.53 -1.28 -9.24
% change in K stocks -0.49 -1.19 -8.62 -0.48 -1.18 -8.58 -0.49 -1.18 -8.62 -0.49 -1.18 -8.60 -0.49 -1.19 -8.65
% change in employment -0.09 -0.22 -1.65 -0.08 -0.21 -1.60 -0.09 -0.21 -1.66 -0.09 -0.21 -1.63 -0.09 -0.22 -1.69
% change in output -0.59 -1.44 -10.44 -0.58 -1.42 -10.40 -0.59 -1.43 -10.44 -0.58 -1.43 -10.42 -0.59 -1.43 -10.47
Industry C
% change in output price -0.02 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02 -0.05 -0.35 -0.02 -0.05 -0.35
% change in K rental price -0.02 -0.06 -0.42 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42
% change in K stocks 0.01 0.03 0.27 0.02 0.05 0.32 0.02 0.04 0.26 0.02 0.05 0.29 0.02 0.04 0.23
% change in employment 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.13
% change in output 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.25 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.16
Aggregate Factor Supplies
% change in labor 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.08
% change in capital -0.03 -0.08 -0.52 -0.03 -0.06 -0.47 -0.03 -0.07 -0.52 -0.03 -0.07 -0.50 -0.03 -0.08 -0.56
Efficiency Impact
EV -0.23 -0.78 -10.81 -0.08 -0.48 -9.92 -0.14 -0.61 -10.88 -0.12 -0.56 -10.44 -0.17 -0.70 -11.42
EV as % of benchmark income 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.00 -0.01 -0.16 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 0.00 -0.01 -0.17 0.00 -0.01 -0.18
Table 4:  Numerical Results Under Central Case Parameter Values

























































































































































netPercent abatement 10 25 75 10 25 75
Parameter varied
EOP treatment (b e) 7.96 9.88 8.68 0.34 0.34 0.38
Input substitution in Y (s y) 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99
Input substitution in V (s v) 1.02 1.02 1.05 0.96 0.96 0.92
Consumption substitution (s g) 1.02 1.02 1.05 0.98 0.98 0.94
Labor substitution (s u) 0.89 0.89 0.89 1.31 1.31 1.31
Capital mobility (s k) 0.96 0.96 0.92 1.02 1.02 1.04
Table 5:  Policy 2 Efficiency Costs -- Sensitivity Analysis
Low parameter value High parameter value








































































































































































































































































































0 25 50 75
Abatement %
%
 
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
-
E
V
Low
High